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Abstract: 
Cyber-attacks have become as commonplace as the Internet itself. Each year, industry 
reports, media outlets and academic articles highlight this increased prevalence, spanning 
both the amount and variety of attacks and cybercrimes. In this article, we seek to further 
advance discussions on cyber threats, cognitive vulnerabilities and cyberpsychology 
through a critical reflection on the social and psychological aspects related to cyber-
attacks. In particular, we are interested in understanding how members of the public 
perceive and engage with risk and how they are impacted during and after a cyber-attack 
has occurred. This research focuses on key cognitive issues relevant to comprehending 
public reactions to malicious cyber events including risk perception, protection 
motivation, culture, and attacker characteristics (e.g., attacker identity, target identity and 
scale of attack). To consider the applicability of our findings, we investigate two 
significant cyber-attacks over the last few years, namely the WannaCry attack of 2017 
and the Lloyds Banking Group attack in the same year. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of cyberspace on society is undeniable. It has provided a platform for 
instantaneous communication, commerce and interaction between individuals and 
organizations across the globe. As cyberspace has grown in prominence however, 
unfortunately so too has the number and variety of cyber-attacks (Verizon, 2018). Cyber-
attacks are defined here as events which aim to compromise the integrity, confidentiality 
or availability of a system (technical or socio-technical). These attacks range from 
hacking and denial-of-services (DoS), to ransomware and spyware infections, and can 
affect everyone from the public to the critical national infrastructure of a country (Nurse, 
2018). In this article, we will examine this topic of cyber-attacks from more of a social 
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and behavioral science perspective, with the aim of exploring the social and 
psychological factors and impacts associated with these attacks. 
 
Research has shown that members of the public are more likely to respond to the effects 
of a cyber-attack rather than the attack itself (Minei & Matusitz, 2011; Gandhi, Sharma, 
Mahoney, Sousan, Zhu & Laplante, 2011). One example of this is a cyber-attack where 
malware infects a national power station causing the hundreds of thousands of citizens to 
be without power. Here, the attack, i.e., the malware infestation may not worry 
individuals (the public), they will be much more considered about the effect, i.e., being 
without power, thereby having no heating, ability to prepare food and so on. There are 
two key areas of impact that we aim to consider and provide an overview of the current 
research and thinking; these are the social and psychological (emotional and behavioral) 
impacts. The social impact of a cyber-attack refers to aspects such as the social disruption 
caused to people’s daily lives, and widespread issues such as anxiety or loss of 
confidence in cyber or technology. Psychological impact can be informed by social 
impact, and can include more personal aspects such as an individual’s anxiety, worry, 
anger, outrage, depression and so on.  
 
To inform our research, the chapter begins by first reflecting on some of the key issues 
relevant to understanding public reactions to malicious cyber-events. We examine topics 
such as: risk perception (Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith & Lamberts, 2011; Rogers, Amlôt, 
Rubin, Wessely & Krieger, 2007); locus of control (Ajzen, 2002); culture of fear (Stekel, 
1930); the online disinhibition effect (Suler, 2004); and protection motivation (Rogers, 
1975; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Blythe & Camp, 2012); amongst others. Also, within 
scope of our assessment are the range of potential factors which can influence the 
public’s level of perceived risk, such as the perpetrator’s identity and the scale of the 
cyber-attack.  
 
Beliefs form an important component of our investigation. This is because a user’s 
reaction to security generally and motivation to apply security mechanisms – if given the 
chance – depends on their beliefs about: the perceived severity of an event; the 
susceptibility to the threat; the perceived self-efficacy; and the cost and efficacy of 
preventative or mitigating behaviors (Blythe & Camp, 2012). These factors make it 
difficult to motivate protective cybersecurity practices (behaviors) as well as to predict 
public social and psychological responses to a cyber-attack. This can be any form of 
attack ranging from existing threats to new concerns such as the cyber risks with Internet 
of Things or Artificial Intelligence (Nurse, Creese & De Roure, 2017).  
 
Another element of relevance is the general culture of fear related to crime and cyber-
events. Fear of crime can prompt people to change their behavior. At the level of the 
individual, people generally respond to the fear of crime by adopting protective or 
avoidance behaviors (Reid, Roberts & Hilliard, 1998). Phobophobia – the psychological 
fear of fears (Furedi, 2002) – can lead to stress, intense anxiety, and unrealistic and 
persistent public fear of crime and danger, regardless of the actual presence of such fear 
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factors. This phenomenon may also relate to the crime complex (Hale, 1996) and 
therefore cyber-attacks and cybercrime.  
 
Having discussed risk and attack perceptions, protection motivation theories and theories 
regarding public reactions to attacks and online crimes, we then critically reflect on two 
real-world cyber-attack scenarios from 2017: the global WannaCry attack and the cyber-
attack on the Lloyds Banking Group. This seeks to understand the social and 
psychological impacts resulting from these attacks on an individual basis as well as to the 
wider society. These are all important topics for discussion and analysis as we aim to 
advance research into cyber threats from a cyberpsychology perspective.  
 
 
2. Factors influencing perceptions of risk and reactions to risk 
 
A user’s motivation to react to perceived risk and apply security measures depends on 
their beliefs about: the perceived severity of an event; the susceptibility to the threat; the 
perceived self-efficacy; and the cost and efficacy of preventative or mitigating behaviors 
(Blythe & Camp, 2012). Also, the general culture of fear related to crime and cyber-
events (Furedi, 2002) can prompt people to change their behavior. In this section, the 
factors influencing perceptions of risk related to cyber events and reactions to risk are 
discussed. Moreover, different theories and theoretical models are presented as related to 
conduct online.  
 
2.1 Perception of risk 
Research in public perception of risk (Slovic, 1998, 2000; Sjöberg, 2000; Dickert, 
Västfjäll, Mauro & Slovic, 2015) demonstrates that there are potential factors which can 
influence the public levels of perceived risk such as whether or not exposure to the risk is 
perceived to be: (i) voluntary (accepting increased risk through risky online activities or 
involuntary (as opposed to knowingly accepted); (ii) familiar (due to the frequency of 
appearance in the media) or unfamiliar (i.e. lack of understanding of the causes and 
consequences); (iii) controllable (due to safeguards that can be put in place) or 
uncontrollable (as opposed to feeling in control); (iv) fair (i.e. random) or unfair (i.e. 
targeted); and (v) whether or not the risk causes ‘dread’.  
 
Also, it is suggested that attitude, risk sensitivity, and specific fear can be used as 
explanatory variables for risk perception (Sjöberg, 2000). Nurse et al. (2011) further 
evidence this in considering that persons use four main dimensions in judging online 
risks, namely ability to control or avoid the risk, dread of consequences, unfamiliarity of 
risks and immediacy of consequences/impact. Members of the public acknowledge the 
threat of cyber-attacks, but the steps that they take to address this threat vary. People 
react to risk in different ways based on dual information processing. Some react based on 
logic, analyzing risk, and others might react instinctual based on feelings about the risk 
(Dickert et al., 2015). Emotions can also serve as a spotlight for directing our attention 
but also motivating individuals to act. For example, people can decide on acting on risks 
related to technologies based on their feelings toward specific outcomes (Nurse, 2018). 
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Other authors propose that, both experts and members of the public might confuse facts 
with their individual interpretation because perceptions of risk are often based on the 
interpretation of facts, which are fed by individual judgement, values, beliefs and 
attitudes (Beck, 1999). Blythe & Camp (2012) argued that overall, a user’s motivation to 
apply security mechanisms depends on their beliefs about their susceptibility to 
exogenous security threats, their potential severity and the cost and efficacy of 
preventative or mitigating behaviors. This therefore fits with existing and prior literature.  
 
Security decisions and behaviors are executed in a world of risk and uncertainty. Adams 
(2013) explains the notion of risk compensation by presenting a risk thermostat. He 
claims that individuals execute a balancing behavior between their propensity to take 
risks (risk appetite) and perceived danger (risk perception), where risk propensity is 
determined by perceived rewards, whereas accidents (negative experiences) influence 
perceived danger. 
 
Trust has been identified as a key issue impacting public perceptions of risk. The level of 
trust in an organizational body responsible for responding to the risk should be 
considered during both the policy-making and communication processes (Rogers, Amlôt, 
Rubin, Wessely & Krieger, 2007). For example, a report by Symantec (2010) showed 
that nearly 9 in 10 adults are considering cybercrime and over a quarter actually expect to 
be scammed or defrauded online. Yet despite the universal threat and incidence of 
cybercrime, only half of adults in the study claim that they would change the way they 
behave online if they became a victim. 
 
Therefore, policy makers need to understand how people think about and respond to risk 
and materialized attacks, given that without such insight policies or awareness efforts 
might be unsuccessful.  
 
2.2 Self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy is considered not as skills themselves, but as the evaluation of what one can 
do with skills. It considers a person’s belief in themselves and their abilities (Bandura, 
1991). This concerns issues such as cyber-attacks because it is important that individuals 
believe that they stand a chance of protecting themselves and responding successfully to 
an attack’s occurrence.  
 
Ajzen (2002) introduced a new concept about the relationship between self-efficacy and 
perceived behavioral control. He argued that “the central concept of perceived 
behavioural control consists of two factors: self-efficacy (about the ease / difficulty of 
performing a behavior) and the ability to control (the extent to which performance 
depends exclusively on the individual)”. When individuals are able to determine or 
influence what is happening to them or what will happen to them, these individuals are 
considered to “be under control”. Control is a central construction in psychology, and 
being under control is a worldwide desirable state of being for most people. The same 
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reality holds in the online world, generally and in the face of a spate of emerging cyber-
attacks.  
 
2.3 Protection motivation theory (PMT) 
According to Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975, 1997), environmental 
and personal factors are combined to pose a potential threat. The threat initiates two 
cognitive processes: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The threat appraisal process 
evaluates the factors associated with the behavior that potentially creates danger, 
including the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards accompanying the actions, the severity of the 
danger, and one’s vulnerability to the threat. The coping appraisal process evaluates one’s 
ability to cope with, and avert, the threatened danger (self-efficacy and response 
efficacy), balanced with the costs (or efforts) associated with protective behavior 
(response cost).  
 
Threat appraisal refers to how susceptible one feels to a threat. For example, how 
vulnerable is an individual by the possibility of becoming a victim of a cyber-attack such 
as phishing; naturally, susceptibility to phishing attacks is influenced by a range of other 
aspects (Iuga, Nurse & Erola, 2016; Williams, Hinds & Joinson, 2018). Coping appraisal 
evaluates the various factors that are likely to ensure that one engages in a recommended 
response that is preventive in nature. For instance, not opening emails being sent by an 
unknown sender, or untrustworthy or suspicious email address.  
 
The theory therefore says that in order for an individual to adopt a safe behavior, they 
need to believe that there is a severe threat that is likely to occur and that by adopting safe 
actions, they can effectively reduce the threat. The individual should also be convinced 
that they are capable of engaging in the behavior and that it would cost only expected 
amounts in terms of effort expended. Measuring the ‘intention’ to engage in the 
recommended preventive activity is the most common indication of protection 
motivation. 
 
Another key aspect of understanding the public response to malicious cyber-attacks 
centers upon the fact that members of the public do not appear to perceive such attacks as 
a threat to themselves and, if they do, they believe that there is very little that they can do 
to prevent such an attack. Instead, members of the public are more likely to respond to 
the event (e.g., loss of service), rather than the cyber-attack, itself.  We discuss this 
further in Section 4. Perceptions of what others expect or how others react to a threat are 
aspects of both types of appraisal. In general, increases in threat severity, threat 
vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy facilitated adaptive intentions or 
behaviors. Conversely, decreases in maladaptive response rewards and adaptive response 
costs increased adaptive intentions or behaviors. 
 
These factors make it difficult to infer social and psychological responses to a cyber-
attack. If we interpret malicious cyber-attacks through the lens of PMT, the current state 
of the public understanding of the potential impact of such an event would possibly be 
described in high levels of threat appraisal, low levels of self-efficacy, confusion over 
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response efficacy, and high response costs due to the perceived difficulty of enacting 
security measures.   
 
2.4 Locus of Control 
Another theory that can be utilized to describe emotional and behavioral responses to an 
online incident is that of locus of control (Ajzen, 2002). Locus of control aims to 
characterize whether people feel they have strong control over their life (internal locus of 
control) or whether they have to rely on external forces (external locus of control). The 
locus of control appears to affect learning, motivation and behavior.  
 
Persons with an internal locus of control feel that success or failure is due to their efforts 
or abilities. Alternately, individuals with an external locus of control are likely to believe 
that other factors such as luck or the difficulty of the target or the actions of other people 
are the cause of success or failure. For example, users with external locus of control 
might not often take protective measures against cyber-attacks due to their beliefs that 
Internet providers or the government is responsible for ensuring a safer Internet.  
Lack of control over a situation that is perceived as threatening or dangerous can give rise 
to feelings of emotional distress, fear and insecurity. Such strong emotions can on 
occasion lead to irrational behavior (Sutherland, 2007) or other equally strong reactions. 
These are all aspects that can influence how members of the public (psychological) and 
society generally (social) are impacted by an attack.    
 
2.5 Extended Parallel Process Model 
Similar to PMT, the Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1992) suggests that when 
the perceived threat is low, independent from the level of perceived response efficacy, 
there may be no further processing of the message. Thus, there is no reaction to the 
invocation of fear because the threat is not subject to further processing (Witte, 1991). 
Also, the Model proposes that as the perceived threat grows while the counter-effect is 
high, the acceptance of a preventive advice will also increase. In such cases, individuals 
can realize that they are at risk of a serious threat and are motivated to protect 
themselves; consider that they can prevent the risk (high efficacy); and may deliberately 
and cognitively take action to address the risk. Fear invocations with high levels of threat 
and high levels of efficacy produce acceptance of a suggested behavior (Kleinot & 
Rogers, 1988; Maddux & Rogers, 1983, Rogers & Mewborn, 1976, Witte, 1992).  
 
The cognitive processes that take place during risk control procedures trigger adjustment 
actions such as attitudes, intentions or behavioral changes that control the risk. However, 
as the perceived threat grows while the perceived efficacy is low, individuals will do the 
opposite of what is proposed. There is the argument that in order to control the 
unbearable fear of a state of low perceived efficiency, a person will either consciously or 
unconsciously, tend to deny the threat, or react against the suggested preventive behavior, 
and perform even more risky behavior to reduce fear or anxiety. This can relate to both 
the offline and the online environments. Overall, when the severity of the threat is high, 
combined with low efficacy, then people may tend to reject the suggested actions or are 
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led to boomerang reactions (Kleinot & Rogers, 1982; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Rogers 
& Mewborn, 1976; Witte, 1992).  
 
These points further evidence research around the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
awareness campaigns which often leads to failure of behavior change (Bada, Sasse & 
Nurse, 2015). In addition, when the perceived effectiveness is moderate, the critical point 
may not occur directly, but at a moderate level of the threat. For example, when 
perceived efficacy is moderate, people may initially think they can prevent a cyber-
attack. However, as the threat grows in intensity and relativity, individuals may begin to 
give up any hope of averting the threat or adequately addressing any subsequent impact. 
 
2.6 Culture of Fear 
In the psychology of fear literature, Stekel (1930) makes the point that fear is in part 
hereditary, a legacy of centuries, that left its traces in our brain. Correspondingly, 
perceived efficacy consists of the individual’s views on the severity of the threat, while 
perceived vulnerability consists of the person’s attitudes about their chances of dealing 
with it.  
 
The theory of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1986) presupposes that the perceived 
ineffectiveness of dealing with possible events is one that creates both fear expectations 
and avoidance behavior. Individuals who judge themselves to be effective in managing 
potential threats, may feel neither fear nor avoid threats. On the contrary, if people judge 
themselves as ineffective in exercising control over potential threats, they react with 
stress and do not want to have any contact with them, therefore avoiding them. For 
example, in the occasion of a cyber-related incident such as a phishing scam, individuals 
might judge themselves as not having the necessary skills or knowledge in order to avoid 
such an incident, therefore avoiding to act or take any protective actions. If this is to 
occur on a large scale, it could have a notable social impact.  
 
Fear expectations and avoidance behaviors are factors that can influence perceived 
inefficiency of managing situations. Acknowledging that human behavior is largely 
regulated by personal efficacy beliefs, people can exercise their activities at the lowest 
levels of self-efficacy despite high fear invocation and can take preventive actions 
without having to wait for the feelings of fear and excitement to arise. Different 
theoretical approaches explain fear control procedures (Leventhal, 1970) or the way 
individuals cognitively recognize fear or threat, changing their attitudes, intentions or 
behaviors to avoid the threat (factors leading to acceptance of the message). Examining 
the causes of fear reveals some interesting realities. According to Witte (1994) the greater 
the threat, the greater fear is expressed. Also, the threat is related to the sense of fear and 
not to efficiency (Witte, 1994).  
 
Witte (1992a) argued that perceived effectiveness only determines the nature of the 
reaction (control of fear or risk), while the perceived threat determines the intensity of the 
reaction (how much control of fear or risk is caused). Considering that the perceived 
threat and the fear-causing appear to be closely related, it is likely that the perceived 
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threat and the emotion of fear cooperate to influence the intensity of a reaction to a call of 
fear. To place this in the context of online threats, when individuals are afraid of a major 
cyber-attack and realize that a reaction could effectively prevent that threat, they are 
motivated to control the risk (protection incentive). This control process could begin with 
thinking about strategies to tackle that threat and reduce the impact of the corresponding 
risk on their lives. When risk control procedures dominate, people may arguably react to 
danger, not to fear.  
 
Considering our case of cyber-attacks, another example would be that victims of fraud 
and computer misuse who have been victimized before might take measures to avoid 
becoming a victim again in the future. The vast majority of victims of fraud and computer 
misuse have only been victimized once, with only a small proportion saying they have 
suffered two or more times. Statistics support this claim indicating that users can be quick 
to learn from their mistakes when they become victims of computer crime (Reeve, 2017). 
 
Conversely, when perceived threat is high, but the perceived effectiveness is low, the fear 
control procedures are initiated. Fear is initially caused, and the threat becomes intense 
when individuals feel unable to prevent the threat. Thus, they are mobilized to manipulate 
their fear (defensive manipulation) by adopting reactions, such as denial. When fear 
control procedures dominate, individuals react to their fear, not to danger. Individuals 
might feel helpless and victimized while their lack of knowledge about cybercrime will 
lead them accepting the possibility of being victims or denying that possibility overall. 
Moreover, victims feel the usual set of emotions when they realize they have been 
scammed – from helplessness to rage.  
 
According to Garland (2001), when it comes to fear of crime, “our fears and resentments, 
but also our common-sense narratives and understandings, become settled cultural facts 
that are sustained and reproduced by cultural scripts”. The idea of ‘cultural scripts’ can 
help to reveal much about emotions such as fear; arguably even in the cyber-attack 
context. A cultural script communicates rules about feelings, and also ideas about what 
those feelings mean. People interpret and internalize these rules according to their 
circumstances and temperament, while always remaining very much influenced by the 
rules. Consequently, the impact of fear is determined by the situation people find 
themselves in, but it is also, to some extent, the product of social construction (Altheide, 
2002). Fear is determined by the self, and the interaction of the self with others; it is also 
shaped by a cultural script that instructs people on how to respond to threats to their 
security.  
 
2.7 The Online Disinhibition Effect 
Regarding the impact of cyber-attacks on online behavior there are different aspects of 
cyberspace that need to be considered. One of these aspects surrounds the reality that 
individuals say and do things in cyberspace that they would not ordinarily say and do in 
the offline (face-to-face) world. For instance, they may loosen up, feel less restrained, 
and present themselves more openly. So pervasive is this phenomenon that a term has 
surfaced for it, namely the online disinhibition effect (Suler, 2004).  
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This disinhibition is empowered due to several factors. These consider the fact that 
people can form a different identity online and that they may feel less vulnerable in the 
way they express themselves or behave, in comparison to how they would act offline. 
Moreover, people can feel less visible online and therefore might engage in activities that 
they otherwise would not. This factor affects our discussions on impacts as the 
consequence of some online actions or activities may not be fully tangible to people in 
the offline world. This has also been discussed in other areas as it relates to cybercrime 
(Nurse, 2018).   
 
 
3. Understanding Public Reactions to Malicious Cyber Incidents  
 
3.1 Emotional Reactions to Cybercrime 
Research indicates that current forms of cyber-attacks can cause psychological impacts 
(Gandhi, et al., 2011; Dallaway, 2016; Modic & Anderson, 2015). Depending on who the 
attackers and the victims are, the psychological effects of cyber threats may even rival 
those of traditional terrorism (Gross, Canetti & Vashdi, 2016). Victims of online attacks 
and crime can suffer emotional trauma which can lead to depression. There is also some 
evidence of limited symptoms of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) in victims of crime in 
online virtual worlds, such as some anecdotal accounts of intrusive memories, emotional 
numbing and upset from victims of virtual sexual assault (Lynn, 2007). 
 
As an example, the impact of identity theft on a victim at an emotional level can lead the 
person becoming distressed and be left feeling violated, betrayed, vulnerable, angry and 
powerless (Kirwan and Power, 2011). Often, victimization can lead victims to feelings of 
outrage, anxiety, a preference for security over liberty, and little interest of adopting new 
technology due to loss of confidence in cyber. The victim can go into stages of grief, 
suffer from anger or rage. In some cases, victims may even blame themselves and 
develop a sense of shame; sextortion is a good example of this given how it initially starts 
(Nurse, 2018).  
 
In other work, a Symantec (2010) study further showed that victims feel that they 
themselves are partly or wholly to blame; this in itself has consequences for the resulting 
psychological impact. The number who act varies widely depending on location. For 
instance, 74% of those in Sweden contact the police, but this is significantly above the 
overall average of 44%. As a general rule, around half of victims will not contact anyone, 
although about a quarter might try taking some action themselves, even if it is only 
avoiding certain websites in the future.  Other impacts can be isolation or even depression 
especially in the event of a financial loss. 
 
According to Symantec, the top 10 emotional reactions to online attacks and cybercrime 
are the feelings of anger, annoyance and being cheated. Böhme and Moore (2012) found 
that directly experiencing cybercrime decreases the likelihood of shopping and banking 
online, while expressing concern about cybercrime has nearly twice as much negative 
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impact on online behavior than directly experiencing it. Modic and Anderson (2015) 
found that victims of financial fraud consistently reported emotional impact as more 
severe than financial impact across all fraud types. 
 
Reflecting on the literature, we can see that it also demonstrates how even non-lethal 
forms of cyber terrorism have a considerable impact on the attitudes of victimized 
populations (Gross, Canetti and Vashdi, 2016). Under attack, victims react with not only 
fear, as do victims of crime, but with demands for protection from the government, via 
surveillance and stronger regulations.  
 
Estonia is frequently invoked in such discussions and a host of authors draw attention to 
the panic caused amongst the people of Estonia when parts of their cyber infrastructure 
were inaccessible due to DoS attacks’ in 2007 (Gandhi, Sharma, Mahoney, Sousan, Zhu 
and Laplante, 2011). However, the potential of large-scale malicious cyber-attacks to 
change the public understanding and perception of cyber events could lead to an 
activation of the ‘dread factors’ of risk perception (i.e. catastrophic potential, fatal 
consequences, and high risks to future generations) which, in turn, can inform a multitude 
of spontaneous precautionary behaviors. This becomes of particular concern given the 
several predictions of possible future technology scenarios, and implications for security 
and privacy online (Williams, Axon, Nurse & Creese, 2016). 
 
3.2 Learned Helplessness 
Findings show that less than 1 in 10 people (9%) claim that they feel ‘very’ safe online. 
Also, only half (51%) of adults asked, would change the way they behave online if they 
became a victim (Symantec, 2010). This provides an interesting comparison to our earlier 
discussions. People might accept a situation, even if it feels unpleasant just because they 
cannot understand it or do not know enough about it. Following this point, one might 
argue that persons may accept cyber-attacks because of a sense of ‘learned helplessness’. 
 
Due to a sense of learned helplessness (for more on the term, see: Seligman, 1975; Hirtz, 
1998) and a lack of knowledge about online attacks and ways to resolve an incident, users 
may simply accept the possibility of being victims. Indirectly, a key question therefore 
becomes, whether they also accept the reality of impacts and hope that the severity is 
low. The anonymous nature of cybercrime, can lead to an acceptance that one (e.g., an 
individual, industry, government) will become a victim of cybercrime at some point. 
Moreover, the sense of learned helplessness can potentially also result in a low uptake of 
protective security behaviors.  
 
Users are called upon to make many security-related decisions every day which can cause 
anxiety. These behaviors include: (a) not opening an email from a sender they do not 
recognize; (b) not accessing unknown attachments; (c) only downloading and running 
programs from trustworthy sources; (d) the use of anti-virus software and security 
software (e.g., firewall); and (e) creating regular backups. Some of these decisions can 
also cause the user feelings of anxiety due to a lack of knowledge about the possible 
implications of making incorrect decisions.  
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Members of the public have often reported a lack of knowledge about a number of key 
areas within the cybersecurity domain. A few examples are lack of knowledge about how 
to use security packages, how to secure their technology devices, and the threats online.  
Even when these individuals are aware of the threats, they may report that they do not 
understand them (Gross, Canetti and Vashdi, 2017). These low levels of public 
understanding of cyber-threats and security practices could lead to a lack of public 
engagement with security issues and a general loss of confidence in cyber and/or 
technology. This also has been seen in the domain of information privacy in the context 
of new forms of technology, where some users now consider privacy as ‘the boring bit’ 
(Williams, Nurse & Creese, 2017). These issues characterize the broad social impacts.  
 
3.3 Cyber-attack related variables 
The public response to a cyber-attack is informed by a number of cyber-specific variables 
such as the attacker identity, the target identity, the scale of the attack as well as the 
government communication of a cyber-attack and the time of revelation of a malicious 
event.  
 
Public reactions may differ according to the disclosed identity of a given attacker. The 
principal categories of an actor are terrorist, hacktivist, and criminal – all of whom might 
be capable of launching attacks that could qualify as issues of serious public concern 
(Nurse & Bada, 2018). Criminals are, on average, less likely to publicly reveal their 
identity (assuming any identity, pseudonym or otherwise) because anonymity facilitates 
them better. Moreover, the target identity can impact the public response. For example, if 
a series of fraud incidents impacts individuals at random, it may be expected that it will 
cause less panic or outrage as compared to a targeted attack towards a national financial, 
utility or health institution.  
 
Additionally, the scale of an attack will influence its impact. The full extent of an attack 
might not become apparent immediately, particularly if second and third-order systems 
fail. Finally, the way that the government will communicate a cyber-attack and the time 
of revelation of a malicious event will impact the level of public response.  This 
information can influence the direction and dynamics of public response. The ways in 
which members of the public are likely to find out about a cyber-attack is also an 
important variable. Different levels of public response can be caused due to loss of 
service, public announcements from the attacker or from government announcements, as 
will be seen in the next section of this chapter.  
 
Lawson (2013) draws upon the history of technology and failures of large sociotechnical 
systems, military history and―most pertinent here―disaster sociology to suggest that 
‘fear and panic’ may not be the defining features of public reactions to future cyber-
attacks. As mentioned above, members of the public are more likely to respond to the 
event (e.g. loss of service), rather than the cyber-attack itself. 
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4. Case Studies of Cyber-Attacks 
 
Thus far in this chapter, we have reflected upon the literature pertinent to understanding 
the impact of cyber-attacks at the psychological and social levels. We now extend this 
discussion to real-world cases of such threats that have occurred over recent years. In 
particular, this work focuses on two cyber-attacks in 2017, namely the WannaCry attack 
and the cyber-attack on the Lloyds Banking Group. Our aim is to examine these attacks 
and the impacts that they have had from a social and psychological perspective, while 
drawing on insights presented earlier in this chapter.  
 
4.1 WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017 
WannaCry was a computer worm responsible for one of the most devastating cyber-
attacks in recent history. In addition to spreading across computer networks using the 
Windows operating system, WannaCry (also known as WannaCrypt and WanaCrypt0r) 
encrypted files of the host computer and only allowed access to those files after a bitcoin 
ransom payment was made. While ransomware itself was not new, WannaCry was 
particularly successful because it targeted a computer vulnerability that many 
organizations and individuals did not yet install security patches (i.e., software updates) 
to address.   
 
Reflecting on the social impact of the attack, WannaCry infected over 200,000 victims in 
at least 150 countries (Reuters, 2017). These included members of the public, but also 
healthcare organizations, car manufacturers, telecoms companies, delivery services and 
the education sector. Due to the nature of the attack, the disruption it caused at the social 
level was quite significant. Organizations closed (causing people to be sent home), 
production stopped (resulting in product backlogs), and many businesses were unaware 
of how best to restore services. Overall, people felt a loss of control (Ajzen, 2002) as the 
threat was so pervasive and the only option for recovery – assuming no recent backups 
were made – was to pay the ransom. In total, these disruptions led to an estimated $8 
billion in economic costs globally (Barlyn, 2017). 
 
In the UK, critical infrastructure such as the National Health Service (NHS) was also 
impacted. A total of 48 NHS Trusts were infected in England and 13 in Scotland (BBC, 
2017a). This resulted in direct disruption to people’s lives in the context of their health. 
Specifically, there were cancelled operations, certain scans and treatments were 
postponed, and ambulances were diverted. This is a particularly worry situation given 
how long patients often have to wait for some treatments. WannaCry also prompted 
government responses – in the UK a Cobra meeting (i.e., an emergency response 
government committee meeting) was called, and in the US, the homeland security 
adviser, was ordered to coordinate the government’s response and help to organize the 
search for the responsible parties (Sanger, Chan, and Scott, 2017). This level of response 
from governments further emphasized the impact of the threat in the eyes of the public.   
 
An interesting point to note here is the government’s comments on the attack. In 
particular, there was an emphasis on the fact that the attack had not targeted the NHS and 
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that it was international. According to The Independent, the UK’s Home Secretary stated: 
“If you look at who's been impacted by this virus, it's a huge variety across different 
industries and across international governments. … This is a virus that attacked 
Windows platforms. … The fact is the NHS has fallen victim to this. … I don't think it's to 
do with that preparedness” (The Independent, 2017). This message was likely meant to 
remove the gloom and potential public despair associated with a targeted NHS attack, as 
well as to reassure people that the country is prepared for such events. This aims to 
support people’s trust in the government and in technological systems.  
 
The psychological impact of WannaCry was also significant. For many it resulted in 
worry, anguish, disbelief, and a sense of helplessness – these are many of the issues 
discussed earlier in this chapter (Symantec, 2010; Böhme and Moore, 2012; Nurse, 
2018). If we use the infection of NHS locations as an example, there are numerous cases 
to examine. Possibly one of the most well-reported in the set is that of a man who was 
preparing for a heart surgery and had it cancelled hours before it was due to take place 
(Fisher, Therrien, Hand & McCague, 2017). This led to his frustration, inconvenience to 
family members who travelled to stay close by, and bewilderment as to why anyone 
would wish to attack a hospital. Psychologically he was also impacted given that he had 
mentally prepared himself for the heart surgery being conducted on that date, and because 
it would now need to be rescheduled to some point in the future. These factors correlate 
with many of the emotional reactions to cybercrime discussed before (Symantec, 2010).   
 
Psychologically, there was also the realisation by many that cyber-attacks could now 
cause the loss of life. As reported by the BBC, a member of NHS staff noted: “Absolute 
carnage in the NHS today. Two Hyperacute stroke centres (the field I work in) in London 
have closed as of this afternoon. Patients will almost certainly suffer and die because of 
this” (Fisher et al., 2017). This view is also reported by another person – an IT specialist 
– interviewed in the article: “This kind of attack usually causes some inconvenience or 
financial loss [to] its victims but in this case it may well cause loss of life”. This is an 
important point as it relates to the severity of the threat (when considering PMT) but it 
can also cause further issues, given that individuals’ behavior will not necessarily prevent 
this type of attack.  
 
4.2 Lloyds Banking Group Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack in 2017 
In January 2017, the Lloyds Banking Group and other banks in the UK fell victim to a 
denial-of-service (DoS) attack that persisted over a two-day period. DoS describes an 
attack where systems are bombarded with illegitimate data or requests, and therefore 
become unable to respond to legitimate requests (e.g., for a webpage or service access) in 
a timely manner (Nurse, 2018). In this instance, the financial institutions were attacked 
by a distributed DoS (DDoS) in which the illegitimate requests originated from multiple, 
dynamically changing locations.  The Lloyds group were one of the most significantly 
targeted banks during this attack, and attack impacts included system unavailability and 
limited online service access for its customers.  
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At the broad social and societal levels, the attack affected millions of bank customers. 
According to reports, perpetrators attempted to block access to the bank’s 20 million UK 
accounts (Collinson, 2017). The result was an impact on individuals and businesses, 
particularly their ability to login to online systems. As such, some customers would have 
been unable to view balances, make payments (e.g., for rent and bills), and conduct bank 
transfers (e.g., for necessary one-off transactions). Another pertinent factor here was that 
this type of DDoS attack targeting the banking sector had occurred in the past.  
 
In 2015, a similar cyber-attack occurred which compromised the services of UK banks, 
RBS and Natwest (Collinson, 2015). A particularly worrying reality of that attack was the 
time in which it occurred, i.e., near to payday; this resulted in a maximum impact on 
some individuals and some widespread panic. One noteworthy difference and a key 
factor in the more recent attack was the number of days across which it took place. This 
extended period of two days (with some reports even suggesting it was longer for some 
customers) meant that not only was the reputation of the bank damaged, but also that 
customers’ lives may have been seriously disrupted during that time.  
 
To consider the response from government, one MP made the point that the cyber-attack 
was worrying for society and that more needed to be done. According to The Guardian, 
the then-MP stated: “The attack on Lloyds was deeply troubling. Thousands of customers 
were affected by this, the latest in a long list of failures and breaches of banking IT 
systems. … As I have already pointed out, it is time to consider whether a single point of 
responsible for cyber risk in the financial services sector is now required” (Collinson, 
2017). This demonstrates some high-level concern for the finance sector broadly as a 
result of these types of cyber-attacks. There are also parallels for wider public confidence 
in technology. To consider the 2015 attack, one Natwest customer tweeted: “Can't log in 
to #natwest yet again to check up on some transactions... and they want me to opt out of 
paper statements?! No chance” (Collinson, 2015). This is poignant as it relates to how 
individuals perceive technology and risk, and how attacks can result in less trust in 
technology.  
 
Analyzing the psychological impact of the Lloyds DDoS attack, it caused customers to be 
upset and frustrated – this was therefore mainly an emotional response. As reported by 
the BBC, one customer expressed: “Haven't been able to access the site or app for over 
36 hours now - is anything being done about this?” (Peachey, 2017). This was one of a 
series of complains made on social media about the ongoing issue. Here we see one of 
the prime uses of social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook and blogging platforms) today – 
i.e., allowing members of the public to directly reach out to companies (particularly for 
complains) and have their voice heard publicly. 
 
While it is difficult to know the full extent of psychological impact, we can assume that 
lack of access to bank accounts and potentially personal funds (e.g., if money had to be 
transferred from one account to the another to facilitate a withdrawal), would have 
significantly increased customer stress and anxiety. There could have been several crucial 
reasons for account access, and depending on those needs, the emotions of stress, anger, 
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pain, depression or helplessness could have resulted. This means that many of the follow-
up issues highlighted in Section 2 and 3 immediately become relevant here. As 
mentioned earlier, the length of the disruption was a core factor as it would have 
exacerbated any initial inconvenience. These are all important concerns because they 
could each incite a change in how the public views cyber-attacks and whether they 
believe they have any control or skills to protect themselves or their families.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
As online threats and cyber-attacks continue to permeate the Internet, it is essential that 
we as a community develop a better understanding of these issues and how they can 
impact our lives. This chapter took a significant step towards that goal by exploring how 
members of the public perceive and engage with risk and how they can be impacted after 
a cyber-attack has taken place. We focused on the social and psychological impacts of 
attacks as these are often overlooked in research and practice. These are, however, crucial 
factors in enhancing our understanding the broader side of attack impacts. To ground our 
work, we examined two well-known cyber-attacks and considered them in the context of 
the breadth of outcomes. It is expected that this research will motivate others to further 
investigate this area and the interaction between cybersecurity and cognitive factors.  
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